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Abortion and Original Meaning is a powerful article that is 
sure to have resonance in the field of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Professor Balkin undertakes what many previously would 
have thought a conjuror's trick: he attempts to locate the consti-
tutional right to abortion, the poster child for imposition of the 
judiciary's own idiosyncratic values, in the original meaning of 
the Constitution. And he seeks to accomplish this feat by pur-
porting to show how the theory of the living constitution is really 
an orginalist theory, once original meaning is properly divorced 
from the framers and ratifiers' expectations of how the provi-
sions would be applied-what Balkin calls "original expected 
applications." 
As such, the article has great strategic value: it attempts to 
appropriate for the living constitution philosophy the intellectual 
capital and public respectability that originalism has earned re-
cently in the academy as well as the wider world. Even more 
boldly, it brands those who have claimed to be originalists as 
heretics to the true religion, on the ground that their focus on 
the original expected applications kills the document's vitality. 
By contrast, Balkin claims that his focus on the principles of the 
original meaning gives it life. 
In our view Balkin presents a false dichotomy-either em-
brace abstract principles whose meaning is almost infinitely mal-
leable or confine the Constitution to the applications the Fram-
ers imagined. We believe there is a middle way that is also a 
better way. Under this view, the Constitution's original meaning 
is informed by, but not exhausted by, its original expected appli-
cations. In particular, the expected applications can be strong 
evidence of the original meaning. Moreover, reasonable people 
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at the time of the Framing likely embraced such principles of in-
terpretation and, as we shall show, it is their principles of inter-
pretation that should guide the content of originalism, not 
~alkin's or anyone else's exegesis of the essence of true original-
Ism. 
In this brief reply we first argue that Balkin lacks a strong 
justification for following originalism of any kind. We also show 
that the best justification for originalism- that originalist inter-
pretation is most likely to lead to good consequences-suggests 
that one should follow the principles of interpretation that a rea-
sonable person at the time of the framing and ratification 
thought would be applied to the Constitution. Applying different 
principles severs the Constitution from the process which en-
sured that the Constitution had consensus support, and it is that 
consensus support that is the best guarantee of the Constitu-
tion's contemporary beneficence. Second, we briefly address the 
role of precedent in constitutional originalism. While Balkin 
suggests that reliance on precedent is a problematic move for 
originalists, we argue that the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion allows for the use of precedent. 
Finally, we show that a reasonable person at the time of the 
Framing was more likely to have embraced interpretative princi-
ples that considered expected applications than Balkin's abstract 
"originalist" principles. In a short comment, we confine our-
selves to brief outlines of two important points. First, people at 
the time of the enactment of the Constitution would have been 
unlikely to eschew expected applications because such applica-
tions can be extremely helpful in discerning the meaning of 
words. 1 Balkin's disregard of expected applications discards im-
portant information that would impede Balkin from reaching the 
results he desires. Second, risk-averse citizens would be unlikely 
to adopt interpretive principles of the kind Balkin advocates-a 
kind of free-form textualism glossed by the meaning which social 
movements of each generation give to the text. Such principles 
1. In our view. the appropriate interpretive rules are those that would have been 
employed in the process of enacting the Constitution. Those interpretive rules would be 
those that a reasonable person at the time of the Constitution's enactment would have 
applied to the Constitution. It is not necessarily the interpretive rules employed by the 
framers or the ratifiers. After all, the process of enacting the Constitution also included 
the general public. who debated and elected the ratifiers. Perhaps the best description of 
this wider set of people would be the enactors, a term which we will sometimes employ. 
Of course. the interpretive rules used by the framers or ratifiers will be evidence of those 
that a reasonable person would have employed, but they are not automatically the cor-
rect rules. 
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carry a great deal of risk, because they do not protect the nation 
against the effects of social movements that pursue undesirable 
policies. 
I. JUSTIFYING ORIGINALISM 
Balkin does not offer a very thick justification of original-
ism. He says: "Constitutional interpretation by judges requires 
fidelity to the Constitution. Fidelity to the Constitution means 
fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of their 
original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text." 
But this formalist defense is insufficient to provide a normative 
defense of originalism and is so vague that it does not provide 
any guidance as to the content of the originalism that is to be de-
fended. 
Professor Balkin's normative defense proves insufficient, 
because he does not provide a persuasive reason why we should 
follow the original meaning of the Constitution, regardless of 
whether the Constitution or the process that led to its enactment 
were desirable. Assume, for instance, that an undesirable consti-
tution was fabricated by a single individual and forced on the 
polity. Would we be obliged to follow this document, simply be-
cause it was the legal text that called itself the Constitution? It is 
a curious position for someone who defends the living Constitu-
tion to offer a justification of an interpretive theory of original-
ism that disregards the consequences of the Constitution for 
those living at the time of its enactment, let alone those living 
today. 
Moreover, it is unclear from this justification why fidelity 
should be limited to the enactors' principles. There is nothing in-
trinsic to the concept of fidelity that requires that we ignore their 
intended or expected applications and follow only their princi-
ples. Indeed, it seems odd to say that you are being a faithful 
agent if you do something of which you know the principals 
would have disapproved simply because the action followed a 
general principle that you purport to derive from their com-
mand. Perhaps that is one possible understanding of fidelity, but 
hardly the only one. For instance, when interpreting statutes, 
many people believe that fidelity requires hewing closely to in-
tentions expressed in legislative history, including expected ap-
plications of the statute. 
Balkin needs a richer theory to justify originalism. We have 
recently provided such a theory ourselves. Briefly, we argue in 
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four steps that originalism is the best interpretive approach for 
the United States Constitution because it is more likely to pro-
duce desirable results than other interpretive approaches. First, 
entrenched constitutional provisions that are desirable should 
take priority over ordinary legislation, because such entrench-
ments operate to establish a beneficial framework of govern-
ment and rights. 2 Second, appropriate supermajority rules tend 
to produce desirable entrenchments by generating constitutional 
provisions that are widely supported and are likely to produce 
net benefits.3 Third, appropriate supermajority rules have gener-
ally governed the passage of the Constitution and its amend-
ments.4 Finally, this argument for the desirability of the Constitu-
tion requires that judges interpret the document based only on 
its original meaning because those at the time of the enactment 
used only that meaning in deciding whether to adopt the Consti-
tution.5 They did not rely on the meanings of Ronald Dworkin, 
Richard Posner, or Jack Balkin. 
This justification suggests that the focus of originalism 
should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the Consti-
tution's adoption would have understand its words and thought 
they should be interpreted. The Constitution's provisions were 
based on commonly accepted meanings and the interpretive 
rules of the time. Some of the provisions had clear meanings. 
Others may have seemed ambiguous, but the enactors would 
have believed that their future application would be based upon 
the interpretive rules accepted at the time. Thus, their assess-
ment of the meaning and the desirability of the Constitution 
would depend on the interpretive rules that they thought would 
apply. It is their view of the appropriate interpretive principles, 
not ours or Professor Balkin's, that should be controlling today. 
This understanding of the appropriate interpretive rules can 
also be defended on the basis of fidelity. We are true to the 
original document passed by the enactors if we interpret it in the 
manner that they would have expected it to be interpreted. 
While one might argue that we are not faithful to the enactors if 
we consider their expected applications when they would not 
2. John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport. A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism. 
101 Nw. U.L. REV. 383,386 (2007). 
3. /d. at 386--88. 
4. /d. at 388-89. While there is one significant way in which those supermajority 
rules were not appropriate-the exclusion of African-Americans and women from par· 
ticipating in the selection of constitutional drafters and ratifiers-this defect has rightly 
been removed. 
5. !d. at 389-90. 
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have desired or expected us to do so, this argument assumes that 
faithfulness depends on the interpretive approach they would 
have expected to be applied. 
In sum, Professor Balkin's distinction between expected ap-
plication meaning and original meaning should no more control 
constitutional interpretation than any other philosophical or per-
sonal conceptualization of meaning. The decision to adopt the 
Constitution was based on an understanding of how ambiguous 
constitutional clauses would be interpreted and that understand-
ing must be respected if we are to derive the benefits that the 
Constitution was originally thought to confer. 
II. ORGINALISM AND PRECEDENT 
Professor Balkin suggests that his brand of originalism 
proves superior to that of expected application orginalism in 
large part because its embrace of broad principles does not re-
quire it to repudiate the substantial number of decisions palpa-
bly at variance with expected application orginalism. He argues 
that those like Justice Scalia, who he views as following expected 
application originalism, rely on precedent to avoid the unpalat-
able consequence of overruling a slew of decisions that have be-
come part of the social fabric. But Balkin argues that acceptance 
of such precedent "undercuts the claim that decisions that are 
inconsistent with original expected applications are illegitimate. 
It suggests that legitimacy can come from public acceptance of 
the Supreme Court's decisions, or from considerations of stabil-
ity and economic cost, not from fidelity to text and original un-
derstanding." 
Balkin's claim questioning the legitimacy of relying on con-
stitutional precedents, however, misunderstands the Constitu-
tion and its original meaning. While Balkin assumes that 
originalism and precedent conflict, that will not be true to the ex-
tent that the Constitution incorporates or allows for precedent, 
which it appears to do in two ways. First, the concept of "judicial 
power" in Article III may be best understood as requiring the 
judiciary to decide cases in accordance with some notion of 
precedent. Second, the Constitution may treat precedent as a 
matter of federal common law that is modifiable by federal stat-
ute-thereby allowing for precedent without compelling it.6 Both 
6. See John Harrison. The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent. 50 
DUKE L.J. 503 (2000). 
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of these interpretations are supported in different ways by the 
fact, which we do not have the space to show, that there was a 
general acceptance of some aspects of precedent when the Con-
stitution was adopted. 7 These interpretations might be combined 
in a variety of ways. For example, the Constitution might incor-
porate a thin or minimal theory of precedent and then leave the 
remainder to be determined by federal common law and federal 
statute.8 
To be sure, precedent at the time of the Framing and the 
early republic may have been relatively soft in that it resolved 
only ambiguities, whereas some modern precedent seems to in-
sulate clear errors of interpretation from reversal.9 While some 
of these clear errors should no doubt be reversed, modern 
precedent rules, as authorized by federal common law and influ-
enced by the structure of the Constitution, might establish 
stronger protections for some precedent. Where it is clear that a 
precedent has been widely and deeply accepted so that overturn-
ing it would lead to a constitutional amendment, a strong argu-
ment exists for the Court to continue to adhere to the precedent, 
even if it represents a clear error. 10 For instance, had the Su-
preme Court not interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to pro-
vide equal rights to women, such rights almost certainly would 
have been adopted by constitutional amendment and therefore it 
makes sense to follow those precedents even if it were clear that 
they conflicted with the original meaning. 11 
Moreover, even if one assumes that the original meaning of 
the Constitution does not contemplate precedent, it is not clear 
why Balkin's evolutionary approach to original meaning is supe-
7. The practice of following precedent is assumed by various notables at the time 
of the Framing. including Blackstone and despite their differences. by both Hamilton and 
Brutus. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. 1 COMMENATARIES *65; Letter from James Madi-
son to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2. 1819). in 8 The WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, at 447 
(Gillard Hunt, ed .. 1908): THE FEDERALIST No. 78. at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1999): Brutus. Essay XV. N.Y. JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES. at 
308 (Ralph Ketcham ed .. 1986). 
8. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent (unpub-
lished paper on file with authors). 
9. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1. 14 (2001) (arguing that precedent would not insulate clearly erroneous 
decisions but only settled ambiguities). 
10. See Reconciling Originalism and Precedent. supra note 8 (advocating such an 
approach). 
11. See McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 2. at 396 (suggesting that the Constitu-
tion would have been amended had the Supreme Court not protected women under the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
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rior to an approach that combines originalism and precedent. 
While precedent would by assumption introduce values external 
to the original meaning, that would hardly distinguish it from 
Balkin's approach. Balkin would allow social movements to spin 
the constitutional text as they choose with no limits except their 
ability to persuade the Court that their gloss should be adopted. 
Precedent, by contrast, at least limits the departures from the 
Constitution to those that have already occurred and does so 
based on widely held values of stability and continuity. 
Balkin also argues that reliance on precedent underscores a 
more important problem with expected application originalism: 
"Our political tradition does not regard decisions that have se-
cured equal rights for women, greater freedom of speech, federal 
power to protect the environment, and federal power to pass 
civil rights laws as mistakes that we must unhappily retain; it re-
gards them as genuine achievements of American constitutional-
ism and sources of pride ... No interpretive theory that regards 
equal constitutional rights for women as a blunder that we are 
now simply stuck with because of respect for precedent can be 
adequate to our history as a people." 1' 
Balkin here appears to be confusing pride and propriety. 
Even if we assume that the decisions he lists are generally 
deemed to be achievements and sources of pride, that does not 
make them either legal or proper. We are all familiar with the 
situation when a decision is made improperly, but it nonetheless 
produces desirable results. For example, a soldier may disobey 
an officer's command and thereby cause a battle to be won. 
While we may be overjoyed by the result in the particular case, 
that would not change our view that disobeying orders is illegal 
and improper. Similarly, the Supreme Court's nonoriginalist be-
havior in these cases might have led to desirable results, but that 
would not mean the Court behaved properly and legally. 
Balkin's celebration of equal constitutional rights for 
women as an unambiguous source of pride is particularly anoma-
lous when he interprets these rights to support a right to abor-
tion. Many of our fellow citizens regard such an interpretation as 
a cause for shame. The mixed perception of decisions that can be 
categorized under the heading of women's rights underscores a 
problem with Balkin's free-form method of interpretation: by 
ignoring original expected applications of provisions, he can 
12. Jack M. Balkin. Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291. 
298-99 (2007). 
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regularly reach results that not only would have been rejected as 
interpretations when the constitutional provisions were enacted, 
but also enjoy no consensus today. What justification does he 
then have for enforcing them? 
In contrast, our theory provides a reason for following 
precedent that is rooted in respect for originalism rather than 
pride. Judges may follow precedent because the Constitution al-
lows judges to give weight to precedent. We are not "stuck" with 
precedents any more than we are stuck with the original provi-
sions of the Constitution. Precedent can constitute part of the 
system the original Constitution established. 
III. THE IMPROBABILITY OF A STRONG DICHOTOMY 
BETWEEN ORIGINAL EXPECTED APPLICATIONS 
AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
In a paper of this length, we cannot conclusively show that 
people at the time of the Constitution's enactment would not 
have applied Professor Balkin's approach, but even in a short 
space we can offer strong reasons to believe that they would 
have considered expected applications in constructing the origi-
nal meaning of the document. First, while the original meaning 
may not be defined by the expected applications, these applica-
tions will often be some of the best evidence of what that mean-
ing is. Second, discarding expected applications in favor of ab-
stract principles, as influenced by social movements, transfers 
tremendous power from the enacters of the Constitution to fu-
ture interpreters. A Constitution that was established to place 
limits on future government actors would not delegate power so 
generously. 
First, reasonable people when the Constitution was enacted 
would have recognized, as Balkin does not seem to, that it is 
hard to ascertain what constitutional provisions mean without 
reference to expected applications. The original meaning of the 
words would not normally be defined by the expected applica-
tions, but instead by the meaning that people at the time would 
understand the words to have. But some of the best evidence of 
that meaning would be the expected applications, especially 
when widely held. Words are slippery things and dictionary defi-
nitions do not pin down their political meanings any more than 
they pin down the meaning they would have in recipes, technical 
manuals, or haute couture. Context is important and the recov-
ery of context can be greatly enhanced by considering how the 
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words would have been applied in the sociopolitical usage of the 
day. It is important to note that Balkin provides no evidence that 
interpretive principles at the time of the Framing (or for that 
matter at any other time) would have discarded so much infor-
mation. 
Using expected applications is particularly important for 
modern interpreters, because usage may have changed in dra-
matic or subtle ways since the Framers' day. Expected applica-
tions are especially useful because they caution modern inter-
preters against substituting their own preferred glosses on 
meaning for those that would have been widely held at the 
Framing. While most important for subsequent interpreters, ex-
pected applications would even be useful when the Constitution 
was enacted, because they would have helped to clarify the 
meaning of inevitably unclear provisions. 
Reliance on expected applications is even appropriate in 
cases when a constitutional provision is best understood as 
adopting a general understanding or principle. The language of a 
provision may appear to adopt a general principle, but verbal 
formulations often do not tell us which particular variation of a 
principle was intended. For example, the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause might suggest an anticaste principle, but it 
may not clearly indicate the version of the principle that was 
adopted- to what extent, and under what circumstances, the 
principle allowed distinctions between different groups. The ex-
pected applications will help us determine which version of the 
principle was adopted. 
Some expected applications might even be given greater 
weight. An expected application might be so much at the core of 
a provision that the application is constitutive of its meaning. For 
example, assume that most discussions and definitions of free-
dom of speech at the time of the Constitution described it gener-
ally as protecting the right to express one's views. Still, if it were 
widely expected that it would categorically prohibit prior re-
straints, then that prohibition might be properly deemed to be 
part of the principle even if later interpreters could make a 
strong case that some prior restraints were consistent with free-
dom to express one's opinions. 
While expected applications are important evidence of the 
meaning of a provision, they are not always to be followed, even 
if they are widely held. But the circumstances must provide 
strong reasons for believing the applications were mistaken, 
rather than being merely applications modern interpreters hap-
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pen to reject. Imagine that deposits were found that appeared in 
1787 to be gold, but that turned out, after scientific knowledge 
advanced, to be a different substance that resembled gold but 
did not have the properties that made it valuable. Even if every-
one in 1787 believed that the deposits were gold, a court might 
properly conclude in 1887 that they were not gold under the con-
stitutional provision limiting states from making anything but 
gold or silver legal tender. In this case, it would be clear as a fac-
tual matter that the deposits were not gold as the term was de-
fined in 1787, even though people had mistakenly believed that 
they were. Even people who believed in 1787 that the deposits 
were gold would now accept that they had been mistaken. By 
contrast, where a legal provision purports to incorporate moral 
or policy beliefs and those beliefs are open to several interpreta-
tions, one is much less justified in concluding that the expected 
applications of people at the time were mistakes. In those cir-
cumstances, the generation that framed such a provision in 1787 
is likely to believe that its application was correct and that later 
generations have simply developed different values. Thus, it is 
more likely that later interpreters are mistaken about the con-
tent of the provision that was adopted than that interpreters at 
the time were mistaken about the meaning of the provisions they 
wrote. 
Second, it seems to us very unlikely that interpreters at the 
time of the Constitution's enactment would have discarded ex-
pected applications because that would have given subsequent 
interpreters a very large measure of interpretive freedom. 
Balkin's own article exemplifies this. When the Equal Protection 
Clause is unmoored from expected applications, it will be filled 
by other kinds of content. In Balkin's case it seems to be largely 
filled by subsequent social movements, as when the clause is un-
derstood in light of the women's movement to encompass a right 
to abortion. 13 This kind of free-form interpretation moves enor-
mous power from the enactors of the Constitution to subsequent 
interpreters14 and thus is unlikely to be embraced by risk-averse 
13. We cannot help but also point out that Balkin's method of interpreting the text 
in light of meaning that social movements bestow on it may well justify Lochner as well 
as Roe. The free labor movement that began in the mid-nineteenth century suggested 
that the right to contract was an essential liberty. In that light, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause could be reasonably interpreted to secure a fundamental right to contract and 
require the government to provide a substantial justification before interfering with that 
right. 
14. At times Balkin seems to be arguing that those who framed the Equal Protec-
tion Clause intended the clause to be given an evolving meaning. In this essay, we do not 
2007] CORE OF ORIGINALISM 381 
citizens. Indeed, it is a little difficult to see what is left of a rec-
ognizable originalism, not to mention the amendment process, if 
social movements have such substantial discretion to apply con-
stitutional provisions as they see fit. To put the point differently, 
why would one adopt a fixed constitution if it can be changed so 
easily by social movements? 
While we are extremely skeptical that Balkin's interpretive 
approach is the one that reasonable people at the time of the 
Constitution's enactment would have employed, we do not mean 
to suggest that the original interpretive approach has been fully 
developed. Although there has been promising scholarship by 
Jefferson Powell, 15 John Manning, 16 and others that suggests that 
the Framers' generation employed an original meaning approach 
to statutes and the Constitution, much more work remains to be 
done on the interpretive principles antecedent to the Constitu-
tion and how they may have been refracted by the constitutional 
structure. Such research will help us determine with greater pre-
cision the appropriate principles of originalist interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite our doubts about important aspects of his theory, 
we welcome Professor Balkin's embrace of originalism. Original-
ism is a method of legal interpretation, not a political or ideo-
logical stance. It will improve the development of a sound 
originalism, if scholars of all political persuasions join the search 
for original meaning and for the original principles of interpreta-
have space to evaluate this claim. But if true. it would make largely irrelevant Balkin's 
claim that originalism should not be guided by expected applications. because in that case 
those who framed the Clause would have expected that its applications evolve. The ex-
pected applications of the Equal Protection Clause would then be the living constitution. 
We believe that Balkin's distinction between expected original applications and original 
meaning is the more theoretically interesting aspect of his paper and thus make the dis-
tinction the focus of our commentary. 
15. H. Jefferson PowelL The Original Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). While Jefferson Powell's article is often thought to count against 
originalism. it is actually at most a critique of original intent originalism. The typical re-
sponse of original meaning scholars is to view the evidence he supplies as supporting 
original meaning originalism. The more general point is that the scholarship growing out 
of Powell's work has done much to show that original meaning interpretation was fol-
lowed by many of those in the Framers' generation. See RANDY E. BARNETT. 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 96-100 (2004); Charles A. Lofgren. The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent. 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1989); Robert N. Clinton. 
Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 'This Constitlllion·. 72 
IOWA L. REV.l177 (1987). 
16. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute. 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (2001 ). 
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tion. A cross-party, cross-ideological consensus will offer good 
evidence that we are reaching correct answers no less surely than 
the original consensus in favor of constitutional provisions offers 
good evidence of their beneficence. 
